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Public Policy and Projects: Making Connections and Starting Conversations – Joe 
Sanderson and Graham Winch 
Project management is very deeply embedded in the public sector. If we follow Morris’ 
(1994) standard account, the project management toolkit was developed within the public 
sector for cold war defence acquisition projects and challenges to that perspective (e.g. Lenfle 
and Loch 2010) also draw on evidence from a public sector project. However, there has been 
remarkably little attention in the field of project organising research to the public policy 
aspects. This special issue aims to address this gap by publishing papers on the role of the 
public sector in the promotion and delivery of major programmes. Although the call for this 
special issue on public policy and projects was not in any way restricted to economic 
infrastructure programmes, in the outturn nearly all the submitted papers, and all of the 
accepted papers, are focused on this sector
1
. So, this introduction will also focus on economic 
infrastructure. This leaves it open for others to promote special issues on important topics 
such as government transformation programmes, social infrastructure, and the acquisition of 
defence materiel from a policy perspective. 
The social and economic role of infrastructure in modern societies is well understood 
(Stevens et al. 2006), yet recent research has identified the so-called “infrastructure gap” 
(World Economic Forum 2012). This is the gap between current investment in economic 
infrastructure and the investment required to support properly economic growth, a gap which 
is widened by the severe dilapidation of many existing economic infrastructure assets (Kanter 
2015; Kessides 2004). Economic infrastructure is also characterised by a “market failure” in 
which private sector enterprise is incapable of meeting the demand for infrastructure despite 
its economic value because they are “collective consumption” (Samuelson 1954), or public, 
                                                          
1
 A partial exception to this generalisation is Santandrea, Sironi, Grassi and Georgino which analyses the UK’s 
HM Treasury data base of all PFI projects, many of which were social infrastructure and, in the early phases, 
information systems projects. 
goods. Here each person can consume without reducing the ability of others to consume (up 
to congestion limits) and it is infeasible to exclude potential consumers of a public good for 
practical or political reasons. The latter condition means that income streams are inadequate 
to provide returns on investment, while the former condition means that it is politically 
acceptable in all jurisdictions for economic infrastructure to be provided by the public sector 
financed through general levies or taxation. The paradigm example of a public good is the 
lighthouse.  
Coase (1974) developed this argument by pointing out that public goods do not 
necessarily mean public provision, citing the example of the UK where the provision of 
lighthouses has been, and still is, a more mixed affair under a Crown charter since 1514. 
France, on the other hand, chose direct public provision by the central state (Bertrand 2005). 
Three of the papers in this special issue (Aerts, Dooms and Haezendonck; Santandrea, Sironi, 
Grassi and Georgino; Teo and Bridge) directly address the modern incarnation of this private 
provision of public goods through the widely diffused public policy initiative on public 
private partnerships (PPPs). 
Once the public sector has determined that a particular infrastructure investment is 
desirable it needs both to acquire the human and material resources required to deliver it and 
also convince stakeholders whose interests are negatively affected by that investment to 
accept it. An initial challenge is to avoid corruption in the acquisition of the required 
resources, because the large sums of public money being invested are honey pots for those 
wanting to make a quick buck. For obvious reasons, empirical research in this area is very 
challenging, so we are particularly pleased to be able to publish Locatelli, Mariani, Sainati 
and Greco on this under-researched topic. Choosing how to acquire those resources through 
the most appropriate procurement routes is a question explored in this special issue by Park 
and Kwak. Their research suggests that the predominance of design-bid-build procurement in 
many infrastructure projects runs counter to arguments in the contracts literature. Convincing 
stakeholders of the merits of the infrastructure investment remains challenging, particularly 
where global winners in the wider economy face local losers whose property and amenity are 
adversely affected by the investment. Current approaches conceptualise stakeholders as 
proactive hubs engaging with reactive satellites (Winch forthcoming 2017), and we need new 
ways of conceptualising stakeholder networks along the lines suggested by Revellino and 
Mouritsen. 
In spite of the importance of these issues, there has been comparatively little research 
into the owner side of projects and programmes across those sectors where the government is 
an investor and owner responsible for the realisation of benefits through life. The principal 
exceptions to this generalisation are reviewed in Brunet and Aubry (2016). Their review 
suggests  that the effectiveness of major projects intended to deliver public policy initiatives, 
typically through some form of built infrastructure, should be not be judged simply in terms 
of rational economic efficiency and the value for money achieved – performance narrowly 
defined. Rather, because taxpayers’ money is being spent, either directly through provision of 
the finance or indirectly by paying shadow tolls and availability charges in PPPs,  and such 
projects have a strong public interest dimension, project effectiveness should be seen as an 
important sub-set of policy effectiveness. This brings into play notions of democratic 
legitimacy and accountability. Here legitimacy refers to the extent to which a project is seen 
as acceptable by the public. Does the project deliver on the policy promises made by 
democratically elected politicians and is it therefore regarded as a legitimate expression of 
their mandate? Moreover, is the public sector owner intelligent or capable enough to guard 
against abuses of power and to ensure the legitimacy of a project delivered in their name? 
Accountability refers to the need for those involved in major public projects, both owners and 
contractors, to have clear roles and lines of responsibility so that decisions can be properly 
audited and scrutinised. This becomes particularly important where the decisions being taken 
are highly controversial and need to be explained in the court of public opinion. 
The six papers in this special issue amply demonstrate the value of using the thematic 
dimensions of efficiency, legitimacy and accountability to create a bridge between the 
domains of public policy and project management. As shown in table 1, we see insights in 
each paper that speak to at least two and in some cases all three of these themes.  
The paper by Aerts, Dooms and Haezendonck suggests how an under-investment in 
project-based learning might have negative consequences for project efficiency, legitimacy 
and accountability. They look at knowledge transfers in two Belgian rail infrastructure 
projects, and find that the transfer of knowledge from the temporary projects to the 
permanent state-owned enterprise (the owner) was limited to an individual and tacit level. 
Broader organisational learning, generating explicit knowledge that might be deployed by the 
owner on future large-scale infrastructure projects, remains underdeveloped in these cases. 
Their key explanation is that these privately-financed PPP projects were politically imposed 
on the owner by the Government and the projects were regarded as atypical. These two 
factors acted as a disincentive for the owner   to invest the necessary time and money in 
capturing and explicitly codifying the lessons from these projects. The authors conclude that 
without such an investment in codified knowledge, the public sector will be constrained in its 
ability to act as an intelligent owner and ensure project legitimacy, to define clear roles and 
lines of responsibility, and to extract good value for money from private sector contractors. 
 
 
 
Table 1 Contribution of papers to thematic dimensions 
 
 
 
 
Thematic Dimensions Common to Public Policy and Projects 
Efficiency  
(Performance and 
Value for Money) 
Legitimacy  
(Public 
Acceptability) 
Accountability  
(Transparency of 
Processes) 
Aerts, Dooms and 
Haezendonck  
 
Project-based learning 
in PPPs 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
Santandrea, Sironi, 
Grassi and Georgino 
 
Market concentration 
risk in PFI projects – 
impact on VFM 
 
 
 
 
X 
  
 
 
X 
Locatelli, Mariani, 
Sainati and Greco 
 
Corruption in public 
projects – institutional 
causes and 
consequences 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
Teo and Bridge 
 
Efficient allocation of 
property rights to 
determine the 
appropriateness of PPP 
mode 
 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
Park and Kwak 
 
Appropriate choice of 
procurement method 
(DB vs. DBB) in public 
transport projects  
 
 
 
X 
  
 
X 
Revellino and Mouritsen 
 
‘Dingpolitics’ in 
megaprojects – beyond 
elite interests, power 
and politics 
 
  
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
The paper by Santandrea, Sironi, Grassi and Georgino focuses our attention on 
questions of project efficiency and accountability. They analyse a dataset from 706 UK PFI 
projects and conclude that the value for money achieved is correlated with the 
competitiveness of the private equity market used to finance each project. So, a highly 
concentrated equity market presents a substantial risk to the public purse, because private 
investors are powerful enough to demand and receive higher rates of return. Given changes to 
PFI policy that require greater involvement of equity holders, this paper suggests that the 
efficiency of PFI projects is intimately linked with the efforts of public sector project owners  
to undertake the necessary due diligence at the front-end to ensure that investors take on an 
appropriate share of project risk. The public sector owner is thus accountable for auditing the 
likely fairness and transparency of equity market competition before opting for the PFI route. 
Locatelli, Mariani, Sainati and Greco examine a little discussed, but crucial issue in 
their paper on corruption in public sector megaprojects. They use institutional theory to 
develop the concept of corrupt project context, a set of circumstances that make corruption 
more likely. They suggest that corruption is particularly relevant for large and uncommon 
projects where the public sector acts as the owner or as the main contractor. Their case study 
from the Italian high-speed railway shows the negative impact of corrupt behaviour on 
project efficiency (cost and time performance) and the value for money achieved.  Their 
research also shows that country context is an important influence on project legitimacy and 
accountability. Significant discretionary power for public officials, economic rents available 
to individual policy-makers, and weak institutions all make a country prone to corruption and 
undermine legitimacy and accountability. 
The papers by Teo and Bridge and Park and Kwak share an interest in the appropriate 
procurement, contracting and delivery modes for major public sector infrastructure projects. 
Each paper thus makes a clear contribution to the question of how best to achieve efficient 
project outcomes. These papers also draw our attention to matters of project accountability, 
suggesting that public sector decision-makers need and would benefit from a transparent, 
rigorous and auditable set of criteria on which to base their choice of project delivery mode. 
Teo and Bridge tackle this issue of decision criteria by building a conceptual framework to 
determine when it is efficient to use the private sector to deliver a public project through a 
PPP. Park and Kwak provide an empirically grounded argument in favour of the development 
of more standardized and objective decision criteria. They analyse data from 1,512 public 
transportation projects in Florida over a ten year period and find notable misalignment 
between theory and practice in the choice of project delivery mode. Park and Kwak find that 
large-scale, environmentally uncertain and technologically challenging projects, which 
contract theory suggests should be delivered through a design-build (DB) mode, are often 
delivered through the more traditional design-bid-build (DBB) mode with negative 
consequences for cost control. They explain this in terms of the project owner’s desire to 
maintain control. They also find that contractor selection decisions where the DB mode is 
used may not be optimal due to a lack of effective competition and inadequate transparency 
on supplier costs and capabilities. 
Finally, the paper by Revellino and Mouritsen eschews the typical concern of project 
management research with efficiency and performance to focus squarely on broader issues of 
democratic legitimacy and accountability. They note that there is already a strong focus in 
megaprojects research on the crucial importance of power and politics for an understanding 
of how such projects are managed and delivered. Through an analysis of the Italian public 
sector system for stakeholder management they argue, however, that the common approach to 
matters of politics in projects presents a rather limited, elitist vision of legitimacy and 
accountability, because it focuses on a narrow set of stakeholders – interested parties, those 
with something to win or something to lose in a direct sense. The alternative vision developed 
by Revellino and Mouritsen uses Latour’s idea of Dingpolitics to argue that we can only 
properly understand how a megaproject evolves if we broaden our focus to include all human 
and non-human actors who are concerned about the project. Issues of legitimacy and 
accountability are thus recast in terms of two key questions: ‘who has to be taken into 
account’ and ‘what has to be taken into account’. 
So, despite the theoretical and methodological diversity evident in these six papers, 
there is much here that shows a common concern with themes of interest to public policy 
scholars. The public sector has been and will continue to be inextricably bound up with the 
promotion and delivery of major projects and programmes. It makes sense, then, for scholars 
in the public policy and project organising research communities to come together in 
mutually beneficial dialogue. We believe that this special issue represents an important step 
in the development of such a dialogue. 
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